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12 January 1984

Since the reorganization of October 1981, the Directorate has made considerable progress in improving the quality, timeliness and relevance of our analysis. One principal result has been a great upsurge in demand for CIA assessments and substantial enhancement of their importance and impact. Even so, we can't afford to rest on our laurels or become complacent. By our own standards, there is still room for improvement.

Rather than give another speech in the auditorium (for which we all probably are grateful), I thought it might be useful to devote a part of each newsletter to looking a little more closely at various elements of the effort to improve our product. This time around, I have focused on the review process for formal papers, quality versus quantity, the research program, and in-house training. I also have included some miscellaneous statistical information on the Directorate you might find of interest.

The Review Process

Several months ago, I asked the DI Management Advisory Group to survey analysts who had completed a major paper in the preceding year to see if we could identify ways to make the review process less onerous and less cumbersome. Several hundred analysts completed the long questionnaire. Because it addressed most of the problems that concern analysts -- excepting space -- I asked that a summary of the results be provided to every division in the Directorate (responding to one complaint that no one ever sees the results of these surveys). If you have not read it, I urge you to do so.

While the survey dispelled a few myths, it also indicated some problems on which we need to work. One purpose it served was to let me know that there were actually many more layers in the review process than I had either intended or think healthy. As a result, I have consulted with the Office Directors and told them that there should be no more than four substantive reviews to which an analyst need respond -- one each at the branch, division, office, and directorate level. Within the office, there should be only one editorial review.

This addresses only one aspect of the problem, however. My perception is that the heart of the issue is less how many reviewers there are than how much the analyst gets jerked

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around -- e.g., one reviewer saying take out detail and the next level saying put it back, or each reviewer having a different idea about how to deal with a particular aspect of the analysis or comments I might have and all dealing separately and often contradictorily with the analyst. The result is the analyst being driven from pillar to post trying to satisfy all the reviewers.

So, in addition to limiting the number of reviewers, the offices must better organize the process to avoid driving analysts up the wall. For example, in responding to my comments on a paper, the office director could either just have the analyst alone fix the problem or meet with the analyst and his or her supervisors to reach agreement together on how to respond. This would avoid the analyst having to make two or three tries until each supervisor separately is content. As the paper goes up the line, perhaps once the branch chief signs off, in more cases where a draft is in good shape the same copy could go to the division chief and then the office director so that the latter can see the text that the branch chief approved and changes proposed by the division chief. The office director could then judge these against his or her own comments and the draft would return but once to the analyst for fixes before coming to me. This might reduce the frustration of repeated revisions and new drafts as well as limit each reviewer sending the analyst in a different direction. It's a tough problem and the suggestions above may have shortcomings, but with some effort, ingenuity and common sense, we should be able to make the process less frustrating.

As we work on this problem it is worth remembering that the basic purpose of the review process is to take the individual ideas or judgments of a single analyst or a few analysts, and turn those ideas or judgments into the institutional position of the Central Intelligence Agency. As an individual, your ideas -- no matter how good or insightful -- count no more than those of tens of thousands of other individuals in various agencies working on international affairs. The review process, by testing your analysis and perhaps adding information and broader perspective, is the way in which your individual views become an institutional position.

It also ensures that the Directorate speaks with consistency across divisions and offices on similar issues. Your ideas are put in front of the President and the National Security Council as the institutional view of CIA, and that view carries enormous weight. And, while some of the words and the structure may change in review and coordination, the survey attests to the fact that in the overwhelming number of cases the ideas and analytic judgments and conclusions that emerge at the end of the review process are very similar, if not identical, to the ones the analyst first put on paper. Working in the Directorate of Intelligence gives you unique access both on paper and increasingly often in person to very senior people in the policy

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agencies. The review process ensures that when you speak, you do so with the full backing and support of the Agency.

Production: Quality and Quantity

Production has increased to the point that it now stands at nearly the highest level in the Directorate's history. In fiscal year 1983 we published over 650 hardcover papers and more than 250 typescript memoranda disseminated to senior policymakers -- a 25 percent increase in production over FY-82. Moreover, these statistics do not include current intelligence, regional monthly publications, the Terrorist Review, the International Financial Situation Report, the IEEW and other such finished products.

The qualitative improvement in our work has been equally impressive. In particular, there has been a marked improvement in the rigor of our analysis and the willingness of DI analysts to address difficult analytical problems in an innovative and policy relevant way. Most importantly, this view is shared by our readers. On the assumption we can keep production up to current levels, I believe we should now concentrate our efforts more exclusively on further improvements in the quality of our analysis. I will return to this in subsequent newsletters but, for now, let me mention three areas where we can improve on present practice, both in current intelligence and in our research and policy support products:

- We are still too reliant on single outcome prognosis, a single "best-estimate" scenario. Too often, we simply provide the policymaker with additional data along with conventional wisdom. We need to devote more attention to identifying less likely alternative outcomes that would or could have major consequences for the United States.

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- Our contacts with outsiders still tend to be too much with people who agree with us. Obviously, we want to be in touch with the authoritative experts in a given field, but we must also salt the mixture with some people with unorthodox and controversial ideas who will challenge our thinking, offer alternative perspectives and ensure that we are considering the full range of possibilities. We also need to have our papers reviewed by such people more often.
- We can bring more realism and "ground truth" to our work by better coordination of analyst foreign travel with research projects as well as by an improved dialogue with our overseas stations. Analyst travel plans and programs while abroad should anticipate forthcoming projects and be structured to take maximum advantage of opportunities to visit important sites, meet with locals

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where feasible and agreeable to Embassy and station, and sit down with Embassy and station officers to benefit from their on-scene experience and expertise.

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### Research Program

In recent weeks, many of you have been involved in completing the 1984 research program. The program, now in its third iteration, has become an integrated planning document that serves many purposes. It sketches out the work we plan to accomplish in the coming year and those areas we hope to investigate. It has become a vehicle for ensuring the integration of external analysis contracts into the Directorate's program as a whole. And it is a convenient vehicle for planning, levying collection requirements, organizing conferences associated with major themes in the program, and orchestrating contacts with outside specialists.

I regard the program as a valuable planning document and completion of the papers listed in it as a measure of progress on the research front. At the same time, when more important issues or problems arise, we should be willing to consider cancelling or postponing work in the research program that has become less relevant or less important than when the plan was originally put together. It would be the worst kind of "clientitis" if we became slaves to our own planning process.

### Some Facts on the Directorate

In preparing for various budget hearings and drawing longer range plans, we have put together some statistics that may be of interest to you.

- When the Directorate fills the new positions authorized in the FY-84 budget, our strength will [ ] At this time, we are aiming for an eventual ceiling [ ] in 1987 -- about the analytical strength of the directorate twenty years ago.
- The Directorate is broken down in percentage terms along the following lines: Analysts - 39%; Analysis Support (ADP support, intelligence assistants, clericals, library and reference support, and so forth) - 32%; Managers - 15%; Administrative Personnel - 8%; people on rotations and training - 6%.

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- Average age of DI personnel is 39; overall, 57% are male and 43% are female. Of DI analysts, 74% are male and 26% female.
- The overall FY-84 budget for the Directorate of Intelligence will be 40% larger than for FY-82. After many very lean years, we have a substantial increase in funds for travel and training in FY-84. At last, we can meet our basic needs in these areas.
- It is a young Directorate. 34% of the analysts are still in their probationary period; about half have fewer than five years experience and 73% have less than ten years experience.
- The average age of branch chiefs is 42, division chiefs 48, office directors 49.
- 267 people are on rotational assignments and in full time academic training.
- A third of the entire directorate was promoted in FY-83. Approximately a third is promoted every year.
- Most analysts in the directorate are in grades 11-14. The percentage of analysts at each of those grades is: GS-14 -- 16%, GS-13 -- 26%, GS-12 -- 20%, GS-11 -- 11%. We also have 33 GS-15 senior analysts and 10 supergrade analysts.

Carrels

In my remarks to the Directorate in the auditorium a year ago, I mentioned that we would build some study carrels in the CIA Library for the use of DI analysts while working on projects. The intent was to gain some limited relief from the overcrowding and noise that has resulted from our unusually high rate of personnel growth in the last couple of years. I am happy to report that six of these carrels have been completed and are now available to you. OCR has sent a memorandum to all Directorate offices explaining how the carrels can be reserved and other ground rules.

Training

Over the last few months, the Directorate has been working with OT&E to design a series of courses to meet our specific needs. You should be aware of these new courses for managers, analysts and support:

- New Analyst Orientation: Last fall, OTE conducted a six-week pilot course designed to meet most of the initial training needs of new analysts who do not enter the Directorate through the Career Training Program.

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The course provides orientation to the Intelligence Community, Agency, and Directorate, and it has major segments on producer-consumer relationships, collection systems, and analytical skills. It provides practice in writing the full range of intelligence products. This training will enable new analysts to begin producing finished intelligence soon after arrival on the job.

- Military Analysis: Two courses treating military analysis also have been developed. The first, a six-week Military Analysis Course, will provide a broad introduction to military forces with special attention to the kinds of substantive questions that analysts of foreign military capabilities often are called upon to answer. The second course, still in the planning and development phase, is entitled, "Military Analysis for Supervisors." The course is about one week in length and will be offered to supervisors who are not military specialists.
- Economic Analysis for Supervisors: Supervisors who want to increase their knowledge of economics and their skills in editing economic reports now have a three-day course available to them. This course will be offered twice a year. Many participants in the pilot running have reported that they now feel more confident when reviewing economic reports.
- Analysis Support: To provide Intelligence Assistants with the necessary background and skills, OTE has developed the "Analysis Support Course." This program is designed specifically for Intelligence Assistants who provide substantive support to the production of finished intelligence. Without exception, graduates have indicated that the training was beneficial. Most found that their skills in analysis and writing were significantly enhanced as a result of their participation in the course.
- SAFE: You are all aware of the rapid introduction of SAFE to the Directorate. We now have some 400 SAFE terminals and will be steadily adding more. To help prepare analysts, managers, and administrative support personnel, ODP has organized a SAFE User's Course which is training analysts almost as fast as their new equipment is being installed. I anticipate that the pace of training will nearly double and the Directorate will be training about forty people a month by early 1984.
- DI Contract Monitoring: We also are instituting a new three-day course for the Directorate's contract monitors. Considerably more analysts will be given duties as Contracting Officer's Technical

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Representatives (COTR) as our budget for external analysis increases. This new course, which is patterned on the DDS&T's excellent program, will prepare our people to manage the purchase of analytical services with confidence and competence. The first running is planned for 30 January - 1 February.

- Clerical Support: A major step forward is OTE's resumption of training for clerical and secretarial personnel. Administrative support personnel now are brought on board and automatically placed in the two-week "Agency Orientation and Office Procedures" course. The course provides an overview of the Agency's mission and structure, and the skills, concepts, and operating procedures necessary to perform the job. I am pleased to note that the Directorate has graduated about forty students since the course began.

I believe we are moving in the right direction and now have available a variety of training programs within the Agency that directly or indirectly contribute to producing timely finished intelligence of high quality. I am especially pleased that these programs recognize the vital role played by the third of our people involved in analyst support. Without their contribution, we would be out of business.



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